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significata of its concrete counterpart, which signifies the forms of those
things which fall under it. But forms for Aquinas, even if they of course can
be conceived and thus signified in an abstract, universal manner, are nothing
but the individualized determination of some particular act of real being,
and this is precisely why they are the principle of being and action in any
sort of agency.
4.
Just to take one more example, from the chapter on appetite and
will, consider Kenny's self-assured judgment that Aquinas's natural teleology "is something which must be discarded if we are to make any use of his
philosophy at the present time", on the hopefully "intuitively clear" basis
that while the growth of a plant is teleological, the falling of a stone is not.
(p. 61.) To be sure, Kenny deserves credit here for not assuming the otherwise perhaps also "intuitively clear", but in Aquinas's Aristotelian framework totally false and unjustified claim that all teleological activities must be
conscious. On the other hand, he never even tries to consider how Aquinas
may have held that even the falling of a stone is teleological. To that end,
however, Kenny would have had to give a comprehensive account of
Aquinas's theory of causation in the overall context of his Aristotelian natural philosophy, which is again radically different from modern conceptions
of causation. But since Kenny fails to do so, his account is misleading also in
the subsequent chapter, where he simply classifies Aquinas as a "soft determinist", as if the contemporary classification could be applied to Aquinas's
theories without any further ado, despite the radical differences between
Aquinas's and the contemporary concept of 'cause'. (pp. 77-78.)
5.
STl q. 2, a. 1; in Phys lb. 1, le. 1; in De Hebd.le. 1.

The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. Pp. 384. $45.00 (cloth),
$22.50 (paper).
KEVIN MEEKER, University of Notre Dame
This important anthology offers not only some significant new statements of and attacks on arguments that purport to provide strong, but
not conclusive, evidence for atheism based on evil but also a fairly comprehensive bibliography on the subject. In what follows I will summarize some main themes of each essay and briefly reflect on a few central
issues in the debate.
The first two chapters formulate the most potent versions of the evidential challenge to theism. Chapter One reprints William Rowe's "The
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". Assuming that God
would only allow evil that was (logically) necessary for a greater good,
Rowe argues roughly that atheism is reasonable because it is likely that
there are some instances of suffering that are not necessary for any
greater good. In other words, because it seems that God (if such a being
existed) could have thwarted the occurrence of certain instances of suffering without forfeiting any greater good (or at least we see no reason
why God could not have done so), atheism is rationally justified. The
second chapter reproduces Paul Draper's "Pain and Pleasure: An
Evidential Problem for Theists". Draper contends that theism fares
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poorly when compared to rival hypotheses in explaining the biological
function of pain and pleasure. According to Draper if God created the
universe it is quite surprising that pain (an intrinsic evil) would contribute to the biological goals of human organisms because God could
presumably create organisms that did not require pain to accomplish
their goals. That is, the biological role of pain is much more surprising
given theism than an alternative hypothesis that denies that God-or
any other nonhuman person-created the universe (this alternative
Draper calls "the Hypothesis of Indifference" (Hl)).
Some previously published responses to such arguments comprise
Chapters Five, Six, and Eight. Chapter Five reprints Alvin Plantinga's
"Epistemic Probability and Evil". Taking aim at Rowe-like arguments,
he argues that we are unable to say how probable it is that we would be
able to discern God's reasons for allowing evil. Hence, it is not clear that
theism is improbable given the evil in this world; and this is true no matter what technical conception of probability one employs. Moreover,
Plantinga contends that even if the proposition <God exists> is improbable on some proposition describing the evils in this world, a person can
still rationally maintain that God exists if she has other nonpropositional
evidence for theism.
The sixth chapter contains William Alston's "The Inductive
Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition", which is an
extended defense of the claim that, given our limited cognitive capabilities, we cannot justifiably judge that a particular instance of evil is such
that God would not forego a greater good by preventing it. To underscore our limitations, Alston points to, among other things, our lack of
data (concerning the after-life, the structure of the universe, and so on),
our difficulties in gaining any reliable information about complex metaphysical necessities or possibilities, our ignorance of what goods may be
beyond our grasp, and the complexities involved in making judgments
of the type that Rowe's argument demands.
Chapter Eight reprints Peter van Inwagen's "The Problem of Evil, the
Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence". In attacking Draper-like
explanatory arguments, van Inwagen cooks up a story that for all we
know is true and, if true, would show that there is no morally preferable
possible world that God could actualize that would avoid the suffering
patterns of this world. Recognizing that some will find his story unpalatable, he sprinkles in a generous dose of "modal skepticism" and contends that we are incapable of forming justified beliefs about the truth of
his story; vanlnwagen then reasons that theists can rightfully resist the
conclusion that theism is a weak explanatory hypothesis because we
have no idea how to evaluate the theistic "explanation". Moreover, he
attempts to augment the plausibility of this strategy by showing how it
works in other contexts such as (i) a Greek atomist defending his beliefs
against" Aristotelian" objections about the behavior of air and (ii) someone who believes that there is life elsewhere in the universe defending
her belief despite all our failures to contact such life.
In the seventh chapter ("Rowe's Noseeum Arguments from Evil")
Wykstra maintains that we can defeat Rowe's argument if we have some
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reason to believe that certain God-purposed goods lie beyond our grasp
(if such goods exist at all). To show that we have some such reason, he
employs an analogical argument comparing the child/parent relationship to our relationship to God. He points out that the more intelligent,
powerful, and benevolent the parents, the more likely it is that their children will be treated with an eye towards their future well-being even if
the children cannot presently understand this. Likewise, then, if God
were governing this world, then we would have some reason to suspect
that our sufferings serve some future, unseen good.
A fresh round of atheistic rejoinders kicks off with Paul Draper's "The
Skeptical Theist" (Chapter Nine) and continues with Bruce Russell's
"Defenseless" (Chapter Ten), Richard M. Gale's "Some Difficulties in
Theistic Treatments of Evil" (Chapter Eleven), and William Rowe's "The
Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look" (Chapter Fourteen).
Draper attacks Alston and van Inwagen's arguments from Chapters Six
and Eight. Alston, he claims, simply overlooks explanatory arguments
from evil and thus hastily concludes from his considerations of our cognitive limitations in the context of Rowe-like arguments that all inductive-type arguments from evil falter. But Draper admits that van
Inwagen's strategy would undermine his explanatory argument if the
"defensive" story spun meets certain requirements. Drawing on examples from other contexts, Draper formulates some necessary conditions
for a "good" defense and argues that van Inwagen's fails to meet at least
one of them. Specifically, Draper claims that a parallel "story" that there
are morally preferable worlds that God could have actualized lacking
the patterns of suffering in this world defeats van lnwagen's story
because it is just as "plausible" and it significantly lowers the probability
that pain and pleasure would be distributed as they are if God exists.
Russell tries to support different types of evidential arguments. First,
he defends arguments that appeal to apparently pointless evils by arguing that after the proponent of the argument has conducted a sincere but
unsuccessful "search" for some reason that would justify God in permitting an instance of evil, she is justified in believing that there is no such
reason and hence justified in her atheistic conclusion. Next, he defends
abductive arguments that start with certain patterns or instances of suffering against van Inwagen and Alston's assaults. "Van Inwagen", he
claims, "has no adequate response to someone who says that, if God
exists, he would be obliged to reduce to some extent the level of terrible
suffering that exists in the actual world" (p. 201). Alston, on the other
hand, unrealistically dictates that one would have to examine all cases of
suffering before one could justifiably believe that no outweighing good
would be forfeited if God prevented a particular instance of suffering.
Gale contends, among other things, that Alston, Plantinga, and van
lnwagen's strategies make any desirable communion with God impossible, cheapen religious life and lead to an "across-the-board skepticism"
(p. 208). Despite containing what are, by his own admission, "potshots"
at his opponents' positions, his discussion is quite entertaining. Here is
one brief highlight:
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I [once] tried to resolve my modal disagreements with the likes of
van lnwagen and Phil Quinn through my modal intuition bowl,
but it proved to be a bust. The networks dropped us because there
wasn't enough violence, just a bunch of ... guys ... staring at each
other and emphatically asserting back and forth, "It is possible that
p,""No it isn't!" [Perhaps the ratings would have been higher if the
networks could have packaged it as a real-life version of Monty
Python's "The Argument".] (p. 213).
Unfortunately, given Gale's enjoyable levity, his "potshot" proclivities,
and his stated aim of attempting to
keep the fire of controversy
burning brightly, hopefully as an aid to some student who is faced with
the challenge of having to write a paper based on the views expressed in
some of the chapters in this volume" (p. 207), it is difficult to know how
seriously to take his comments.
Chapter Fourteen is William Rowe's latest attempt to simplify his
argument that led off this volume. Instead of arguing inductively from
the premise that
fl • • •

(1) no good we know of justifies God in allowing certain instances of
evil

to the conclusion that
(2) in fact no good justifies God in allowing these particular evils
(from which he can deductively argue for atheism), with the help of
Bayes' Theorem he now wants to bypass (2) altogether and argue that
atheism is probable on (1). To defend this reasoning, Rowe addresses
some issues raised by Wykstra and Alston. According to Rowe if we
take Wykstra's analogy seriously, then we should expect that God, like a
good parent, would try to comfort us when we suffer. Because many
sufferers do not experience God's calming presence, Wykstra's analogy
fails and thus we lack any reason to expect that goods that justify God in
allowing suffering are likely to be beyond our grasp. The inference from
(1) to atheism thus emerges unscathed. In addition, according to Rowe
even Alston does not show (by his own admission) that we cannot be
justified in believing that no good we know of would justify God's permitting certain evils because Alston appeals to goods beyond our ken. So
Alston has not shown that (1) is unjustifiable.
Chapters Twelve, Thirteen, Fifteen and Sixteen offer some final theistic
responses. Chapter Twelve provides us with van Inwagen's "Reflections on
the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale". In responding to Draper, van
Inwagen recasts the discussion of epistemic probability in terms of epistemic judgments about "objective" probabilities to reformulate the general
epistemic principle that he invoked in defending theism; he then claims that
he sees
nothing in 'The Skeptical Theist' to undermine either the general epistemic principle I have appealed to or my application of it" (p. 229).
But he not only disputes Draper's handling of one of the examples from
fl • • •
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which Draper gleaned some necessary conditions for a good defense but
also defends his discussion of extraterrestrial life against Draper's criticisms.
Similarly, he crisply maintains that " ... Russell seems simply to deny the
conclusion of my argument [from note 11 in Chapter Eight] without any
discussion of the argument" (p. 234). Finally, he vindicates his modal skepticism from Gale's attacks by arguing that (a) it does not lead to a radical
skepticism because his story is not improbable on what we know (unlike
Cartesian-type hypotheses that are improbable given what we know) (b) he
applies his skepticism fairly to arguments for and against theism, and (c) his
skepticism does not rule out all modal judgments as unjustified.
Chapter Thirteen ("On Being Evidentially Challenged") contains
Plantinga's riposte to Draper's explanatory argument. Plantinga argues
that even if (HI) is a relevant alternative to theism, it is not clear that the
antecedent probability that the world would contain such patterns of pain
and pleasure is much lower on theism than (HI). He also maintains that
because such arguments are relative to a given epistemic situation, in his
situation he is free to assess these hypotheses in light of his belief in eternal life and what this belief tells us about pain-and-pleasure patterns.
Because theism is more probable if there is eternal life, Draper's argument
loses its force. Finally, Plantinga contends that appeal to such beliefs is
not dialectically deficient if one has flOnpropositional support for theism.
In the fifteenth chapter, Daniel Howard-Snyder ("The Argument from
Inscrutable Evil") maintains that evidential arguments from evil may be
rare cases where one must be justified in a higher-level belief (e.g., that
the inference from inscrutable evil to atheism is justified) to infer justifiably that God does not exist. To foreclose any future arguments that
would try to show that this inference is justified, he argues for the following epistemic principle:

We CIlnnot see an x justifies believing there is 110 x only if we have no
good reason to be in doubt about whether we would very likely to
see x, if there were one (p. 299).
Regarding inscrutable evil, then, he argues that we do have reason to be in
doubt about the likelihood that we could discern the goods in question
because (i) given humanity's progressive knowledge it would not be surprising if there were more goods for us to uncover and (ii) it would not be
surprising if the goods that would justify God in allowing certain evils
were too complex for us to grasp. After defending these arguments
against some objections, Howard-Snyder nevertheless claims that the argument from divine silence (why doesn't God, like a good parent, comfort
those who experience such severe suffering?), if successful, would help to
establish the justifiability of the atheistic inference from inscrutable evil.
In Chapter Sixteen William Alston draws the theistic rejoinders and the
volume to a close with "Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential
Arguments from Evil". After disputing the probability assignments in
Rowe's revised Bayesian argument, Alston returns to Rowe's first formulation to contend that the inference is unjustified. It is unjustified for the
same reason that, say, a neophyte's inference that there is no reason for a
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master chess player's particular move from the fact that she sees no reason
for this move is unjustified. For the amateur should expect that the
expert's judgment would far outstrip her own. But such a situation does
not impose what would, on Alstonian grounds, amount to an inadmissible
higher-level requirement for the belief to be justified. For according to
Alston, "[w]hat it takes for me to be in a position to make that inference is
that there are, in the larger community, with which I am potentially in
effective contact, persons who have sufficient reason to think that what we
can discern of justifying reasons is an adequate guide to what justifying
reasons God has available to Him" (p. 327). Because no finite human can
have such a sufficient reason, no one is justified in making this inference.
Finally, he argues that Draper's argument is not explanatory: at best it is an
argument about epistemic probability because the hypotheses that Draper
compares do not explain anything (in any intelligible sense of the term).
We can now see why the third and fourth chapters are somewhat peculiar
in the broad scope of this volume. In Chapter Three ("Some Major Strands
of Theodicy") Richard Swinburne does not attempt to show that the evils of
the world could, for all we know, serve a greater good; rather, he tries to display how they actually do contribute to greater goods. Complaining that
much of the discussion of evil centers too narrowly on pleasure and pain, he
argues that there are many actual goods (e.g., the having and satisfaction of
desires, having compassionate desires, having significant free choice, and so
on) the realization of which require evil. Unfortunately, although some
opponents suppose that Swinburne's stance is more consistent than "skeptical theists" (Draper, p.l88), none of them discuss his suggestions.
In "Aquinas on the Sufferings of Job'" (Chapter Four), Eleonore Stump
shows that Aquinas (in contrast with most other theistic views in this volume)
held that we can ascertain the goods the sufferer will attain by enduring pain:
specifically, God allows suffering as a kind of remedy for the disease of
human sinfulness. (Bringing the metaphor up-to-date, Stump compares suffering to a type of chemotherapy designed to eradicate the cancer of sin.)
Those who persevere can more fully fulfill their human nature and enjoy contemplating God. Learning about Aquinas's tack is beneficial according to
Stump because it reveals not only how discussions of evil depend on broader
issues, but also how some assumptions about these issues that we uncritically
take for granted have not been universally embraced.
Unfortunately, I have only provided the barest outline of these essays.
Many rich and subtle topics cry out for comment. Here I want briefly to
reflect on skepticism and the epistemology of modalities. Both sides
seem to have more work to do on such topics. For instance, some on the
atheistic side are too quick to accuse the theists of either being inconsistent in their skeptical stances or imposing justificatory standards that
lead to a radical skepticism in defending theism. Let me illustrate this
attitude with a summary remark from Draper: 'The skeptical theist is
trying to walk a tightrope-to use skepticism to defend a position that
seems to many to be a paradigm case of something that one should be
skeptical about" (p. 188). But surely it is only to the atheist or agnostic
that theism is a paradigm case of what one should be skeptical about; a
paradigm case acceptable to all would be some proposition along the
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following lines: there were an even number of stars in the universe on
July 4, 1976 at twelve noon, Eastern Daylight Savings Time.
But "skeptical theists" have not answered all nagging questions. This is
evident in even the most explicit statement of "modal skepticisml!-van
Inwagen's: "If the subject matter of p is remote from the concerns of everyday life, then our ordinary powers of 'modalization' are not reliable guides
to the modal status of pI! (p. 237). This principle is not entirely helpful
because van Inwagen himself so easily generates a counterexample: "We
certainly know the modal status of 'If God exists, then there is an immaterial being' and the 'subject matter' of this proposition is, no doubt, remote
from the concerns of everyday life" (p. 237). So one is still left wondering
which modal judgments "removed from everyday life" are justified and
which ones aren't. Now I am not suggesting that no Chisholming can save
this formulation; nor did I intimate that the atheist cannot show that the
standards employed by theists lead to an objectionable version of skepticism. I am simply pointing to an area that deserves further philosophical
exploration, as do many of the other topics broached in this volume.
In many ways, this collection portrays philosophy at its best (though the
exchange between van Inwagen and Gale is a bit acrimonious); it shows
philosophers from differing perspectives coming together to make progress
on a specific issue. A pleasant benefit is that this volume, unlike many other
anthologies, for the most part has the feel of a genuine philosophical conversation. In the course of this conversation, members from both camps graciously concede that their previous formulations need various repairs and
they attempt to reformulate them to avoid these defects. Perhaps most
importantly, this conversation features some of the most important ,"Titers
in the field offering new perspectives and arguments. Although I am not a
prophet, I suspect that some of these new arguments will soon become a reference point for many debates on evil and the existence of God. For putting
such a resource at our fingertips, we are all indebted to the authors whose
work is collected here and especially the" collector" himself: Daniel HowardSnyder.2
NOTES
1. Stump's reprinted essay brings the total of reprinted articles to six
(not five-oops!-as the cover states).
2. I wish to thank Daniel Howard-Snyder and Philip L. Quinn for some
comments on previous drafts of this review. Any errors that remain are, of
course, my responsibility and from them one may conclusively infer that I
am neither omniscient, omnipotent nor omnibenevolent.

The Concept of Faith: A Philosophical Investigation, by William Lad
Sessions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994. 298 pp.
GEORGE MAVRODES, University of Michigan
This book is an unusually provocative and suggestive contribution to the
recent literature in the philosophy of religion. It undertakes to explore the

